

Re Enclosure.

The Island of Sicily
may be Subject to Attack
in Two different ways—
The First— by collecting
a considerable Force on
the opposite Coast of
Calabria, and taking
Advantage of the favorable
Circumstances of Wind
& Weather, to pass this
Force in Small Craft,
through the Strait
of Messina.— This
appears to have been
the Plan intended to
have been adapted
in

in the last year (1810)
under the Superintendance
of Murat, but the only
attempt to carry it into
Execution, proved entirely
abortive.

The other Plan necessarily
depends upon a large
Armament to be prepared
at Toulon, or in some
distant Port of France,
or Italy, from whence,
a considerable Body
of Troops must be
carried to the neighbourhood
of Palermo, or to some
part

part of Sicily, remote
from Messina.

This Armament would
constitute the main
part of the Operation
whilst a Force was
collected in Calabria,
to threaten an Attack
on Messina by the
Streights, & thereby, to
keep the British Army
in that Quarter, in
Check.

The British Army
at present in Sicily,
including a proportion
of

of Foreign Regiments,
consists of about
15,000 Effective Rank
& File. — This Force
is assembled in the
Neighbourhood of Messina,
with the exception of one
Battalion at Agosta,
and one at Syracuse,
and may be said to
occupy a Triangle
of the Island of Sicily.
The Base of which, would
be a line drawn from
Taormina, to Cape
de Calava.

There

There can be little
doubt that the British
Force thus collected, aid-
ed by a Flotilla, is
sufficient according
to the probable chances
of War, to defend the
Island of Sicily against
any attack made by
the Enemy from the
opposite Coast of
Calabria - But if a
French Force could be
brought from Toulon
or elsewhere, & landed
near Palermo, or in
any other remote
part

part of the Island,
 and a Force could
 at the same time
 be collected in Calabria
 as a Diversion, the
 British Army would not
 in such case be
^{for the two purposes}
 sufficient of Defending
 the part of the Country
 which it now occupies,
 against an Attack
 from Calabria, and
 at the same time of
 detaching a Force into the
^{to operate}
 Interior, against the
 main Body of the
 Enemy.

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The Success, however,
 of such an Expedition
 on the part of the
 Enemy, must depend
 upon their escaping
 the British Fleet in
 the Mediterranean,
 an Event certainly
 improbable, but not
 altogether impossible.

The Question then
 arises, whether, if such
 an Event should occur,
 either with or without
 Treachery on the part
 of the Court of Palermo,
 The

The British Army,
in its present position,
could be considered
as in a state of se=
=curity, and would
be enabled ultimately,
if circumstances should
render it necessary,
to effect its embarkation
from Sicily. —

Upon this material
part of the subject,
it appears upon
inquiry, that no
doubt need reasonably
be entertained — The
Country between Palermo
and

and Messina, is
so Mountainous and
Strong - The Roads
so few - The Soil so
deep - that it would
be scarcely possible
for an Enemy to bring
the heavy Artillery by
Land, at all, and
certainly not under
many Months, which
would be necessary
to enable them to
Attack Messina and
Melazzo, under the
Protection of which
Places

Places, the British
 Army could always
 Embark in Safety -
 Melazzo indeed, from
 its Position, might
 easily be rendered
 nearly Impregnable,
 and the Bay which
 it Commands, is the
 finest possible Position
 for the Embarkation,
 or Disembarkation, of
 Troops - The Transports
 & small Craft which
 could easily be collected,
 would be sufficient
 to

to remove the British
 Army to Malta, to
 the Ionian Islands,
 or to any other safe
 Station - But even
 if it were judged
 expedient to require
 the Protection & Assistance
 of a Part of the British
 Fleet, there could be
 no doubt that the British
 Army could maintain
 itself in the principal
 Positions which it now
 occupies, till such time
 as a sufficient part of
 the Fleet, could be detached
 for its Relief.

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